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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLOF NELSON CONSTRUCTION 
CO~IP ANY, VINCENT-PETER-
SON CONSTRUCTION COI\I-
PANY, GRONEniAN & COM-
PANY, YOUNG & SMITH CON-
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Case No. 
7633 
BRIEF OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COUNCIL, 
INTERVENOR, HERETOFORE APPOINTED 
AMICUS CURIAE 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Industrial Relations Council, by leave of this 
Honorable Court first had and obtained, files herewith 
its brief as Amicus Curiae. 
The questions raised by petitioners and appellants 
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are of first in1pression before this lionorable Court 
The questions involved are of great importance in this 
area. rrhere is a great divergence of opinion among 
these groups as to the application of the Utah law per. 
taining to the question involved. 
The respondents and appellees and the petitioners 
and appellants have set forth the facts pertaining to 
this case, and this intervenor will not, therefore, at this 
time make any statement of facts, but will refer to 
the facts in this case as they apply to the argument 
presented. 
The petitioners and appellants have set forth two 
points in their brief. However, we believe that the point 
as set forth in the brief of the respondents and appellees 
clearly sets forth the point in question, and we will, 
therefore, adopt that point of the respondents and appel. 
lees and present our argument in relation thereto. 
ARGUMENT 
THE CLAIMANTS WERE UNEMPLOYED DUE TO 1t 
STOPPAGE OF WORK WHICH EXISTED BECAUSE OF 
A STRIKE INVOLVING THEIR GRADE, CLASS, OR GROUP 
OF WORKERS AT THE FACTORY OR ESTABLISHMEN'I 
AT WHICH THEY WERE LAST EMPLOYED. 
For the convenience of the court we quote herewith 
Section 42-2a-5 (d), Utah Code Annotated 1943, the par-
ticular statute in question, which provides in part as 
follows: 
"An individual shall be ineligible for benefits 
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
" (d) For any week in which it is found by 
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the Commission that his unen1ploYJ.nent is due to 
a stoppage of work which exists because of a 
strike involving his grade, class, or group of 
workers at the factory or establishment at which 
he is or was last employed." (Italics ours.) 
It is the position of this i:o.tervenor that for the 
claimants to be eligible to the benefits of the Utah 
Employment Security Act, it must be conclusively shown 
that the unemployment of the claimants h~rein was not 
due to a stoppage of work which existed because of a 
strike involving their grade, class or group. 
It is our further position that it must be shown that 
the claimants were not a part of the group that was 
involved in the strike. The mere fact that the claimants 
and those employees who went out on strike did not have 
a common employer does not, because of this fact, alter 
or change the situation. In interpreting the Utah Em-
ployment Security Act, the question arises, were the 
claimants unemployed due to a stoppage of work which 
existed because of a strike involving their grade, class 
or group1 
It is our position that there is only one answer, 
and that answer is "yes." 
In labor relations, Labor Boards many times deter-
mine groups or bargaining units to include employees 
of many employers, which is commonly referred to as a 
multi-employer unit; that is, units or groups in which 
the employees do not have a common employer. How-
ever, such groups are appropriate units and are so 
determined by Labor Relations Boards. 
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For assistance to this Honorable Court, we will 
set forth decisions and instances where Labor Boards 
have determined that multi-employer groups or bargain-
ing units, for the best interests of all parties involved 
and for the purpose of maintaining industrial peace, 
are necessary and essential for the purposes of collective 
bargaining. That is, to have groups in the same industry, 
job classifications, etc., but not the same common em-
ployer. 
As we understand the facts in this case, the Asso-
ciated General Contractors of America, Intermountain 
Branch, bargained for certain contractors who were 
signatories to the agreement between the contractors 
and the union. That the unions included various crafts, 
which were known as the six basic crafts, to-wit: The 
International Hod Carriers, Building and Common 
Laborers Unio_n; the United Brotherhood of Carpenters 
and Joiners of America; the International Union of 
Operating Engineers; the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America; the Operative Plasterers and Cement Finishers 
Association; and the International Association of Bridge, 
Structural, and Ornamental Iron Workers, all affiliated 
with the American Federation of Labor and representing 
the local unions of the state. 
For many years the unions, that is, the six basic 
crafts, have bargained as a group, with the contractors 
as a group, and when a contract has been arrived at, 
an identical contract is executed with the contractors 
being signatory thereto. 
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The pattern of collectiYe bargaining history has 
been that the Associated General Contractors has been 
the representative of the contractors as a group, and 
the employees of that group have been and did constitute 
an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining, notwithstanding that they did not have a com-
mon employer, ·with the six basic crafts acting as a unit. 
It is our opinion from the facts in this case-that 
is, the collective bargaining history-that the employers 
herein constitute a multi-employer bargaining unit. Such 
a group constitutes an appropriate unit for the purposes 
of collective bargaining. The decisions of the National 
Labor Relations Board would sustain our position with 
respect to this matter. 
\Ve feel that it would be enlightening to this Honor-
able Court to refer to the Utah Labor Relations Act, 
Title 49, Chapter 1, and particularly Section 17, Subsec-
tion (b), as well as the same comparable section of the 
Labor :Management Relations Act of 1947, known as 
Title 29, Section 159, Subsection (b), which provides in 
part as follows : 
Utah Labor Relations Act: 
"49-1-17- Collective Bargaining-Represen-
tatives. (b) The board shall decide in each case 
whether, in order to insure to employees the full 
benefit of their right to self-organization and to 
collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate 
the policies of this act, the unit appropriate for 
the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the 
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivi-
sion there of." 
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Labor :Management Act of 1947, as amended: 
"Title 29, Sec. 159, Subsection (b) USCA. 
(b) The Board shall decide in each case whether, 
in order to insure to employees the full benefit 
of their right to self-organization and to collective 
bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the pol-
icies of sections 151-166 of this title, the unit 
appropriate for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, 
plant unit, or subdivision thereof." 
The Utah Labor Relations Board, as far as this 
intervenor can ascertain, has not yet had the occasion 
to make a finding of what is referred to many times 
as a multi-employer unit. However, the National Labor 
Relations Board, on many occasions, has done so under 
and by virtue of the provisions of Title 29 above referred 
to. 
For the convenience of this court, we think it would 
be enlightening to refer this court to National Labor 
Relations Board decisions on the appropriateness of 
multi-employer bargaining units. The Board has held 
that certain groups or units constitute an appropriate 
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining, notwith-
standing the fact the employees do not have a common 
employer. 
For illustration, just recently the National Labor 
Relations Board directed that an election be held in 
seven dairies and ice cream plants in the State of Utah. 
These plants distributed ninety percent of the milk and 
ice cream in the State of Utah. In conducting this elec-
tion the employees were treated as though having one 
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common en1ployer, notwithstanding the fact that the 
seven dairies and ice cream manufacturers involved 
had plants from Ogden on the north to Cedar City on 
the south. In conducting the election among the employ-
ees for the purpose of determining whom they desired 
to represent them for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing, the election was conducted as though all of these 
employees worked for one employer, and the Board 
directed that the union to be designated must receive 
a majority of the votes of the employees voting, without 
regard to their places of employment. 
This case has not yet come out in the Advance 
Sheets of the Labor Relations Manual and, therefore, 
does not have a reference number. 
The National Labor Relations Board's decisions on 
the appropriateness o£ multi-employer bargaining units 
make it clear that the controlling factor in such cases 
is the factual existence of a history and pattern of joint 
bargaining. Bunker Hill and Sullivan Mining and Con-
centrating Company, 89 NLRB No. 8 (1950); Brewery 
Proprietors of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 62 NLRB 163 
(1945) ; Waterfront Employers Association of the Pacific 
Coast, 71 NLRB 80 ( 1946). The Board summarized its 
position on this point recently in the Bunker Hill case 
as follows: 
"The Board has held that the essential ele-
ment for establishing a multi-employer unit is 
participation by a group of employers, whether 
members or non-members of an association, either 
personally or through an authorized representa-
tive, in joint bargaining negotiations. We have 
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found such units appropriate although the par-
ticular employers involved did not belong to a 
formal employer association, each employer had 
its own representative present during negotia-
tions, and the negotiations resulted in the execu-
tion of separate, but identical contracts." 
Past bargaining history has been ruled conclusive 
by the National Labor Relations Board in numerous 
cases upholding multi-employer units against attempts 
to carve out single-plant units. Rayonier, Incorporated, 
52 NLRB 1269 (1943); Hazel-Atlas Glass Company, 
59 NLRB 706 (1944); Kalamazoo Stove and Furnace 
Company, 61 NLRB 1041 (1945); Springfield Plywood 
Corporation, 61 NLRB 1295 (1945); Richard Young Co., 
64 NLRB 733 ( 1945) ; Waterfront Employers Associa-
tion of the Pacific Coast, 71 NLRB 80 (1946); Cloth 
Laying Appliances Corporation, 78 NLRB 785 (1948); 
Geo. J. Renner Brewing Company, 79 NLRB 1449 
(1948) ; Pacific American Ship Owners Association, 80 
NLRB 622 (1948) ; Furniture Firms of Duluth, 81 NLRB 
1318 (1949); Air Conditioning Company of Southern 
California, 81 NLRB 946 (1949) ; New England Fish 
Company, 83 NLRB 656 (1949); Balaban & Katz, 87 
NLRB No. 133 (1949); Bunker Hill and Sullivan Mining 
and Concentrating Company, 89 NLRB No. 8 (1950); 
Cleveland Builders Supply Co., 90 NLRB No. 136 (1950). 
In the Springfield case, supra, both points are relied 
on as follows: 
"This system of dealing which has become 
traditional among the group of plywood operators 
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and locals who have participated therein, has 
proved conducive to the orderly functioning of 
collective bargaining and has contributed to uni-
formity and stability of labor relations in a com-
paratively large portion of the plywood manu-
facturing industry. The record indicates that 
during the period covered by uniform labor agree-
ments and joint collective bargaining on the part 
of both unions and employers, the plywood manu-
facturing industry as represented by members of 
the CIO group in the Employer Association, has 
been singularly free from major industrial strife. 
* * * * * 
"On the basis of the facts above referred to, 
and upon the entire record in the case, we are of 
the opinion that, notwithstanding evidence indi-
cating the appropriateness, from a functional 
viewpoint, of a bargaining unit confined to one 
plant of a single employer, the course of collective 
bargaining, which since 1940 has been conducted 
on a multiple-employer or Association-wide basis, 
1nust govern the scope of the appropriate unit in 
the present instance. In reaching this conclusion, 
we find that the facts in the present proceeding 
are substantially similar to those in prior cases 
in which 1nultiple-employer units have been found 
appropriate, where, notwithstanding the inforn1al 
character of the employer associations therein 
concerned, the members of such associations have 
'established a practice of joint action in regard 
to labor relations by negotiation with an effective 
employee organization, and have, by their custo-
mary adherence to the uniform labor agreements 
resulting therefrom, demonstrated their desire to 
be bound by group rather than by individual ac-
tion'." 
We believe that the Utah Employment Security 
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Act in some particulars is in pari materia with the 
Utah Labor Relations Act, although passed at different 
sessions of the Utah State Legislature. 
It was the purpose of the legislature in enacting 
42-2a-5d, Utah Code Annotated 1943, not to permit 
employees in their grade, class or group to be eligible 
for benefits if their unemployment is due to a stoppage 
of work which existed because of a strike. 
The Utah Labor Relations Act was amended in 
1943, and the legislature at that time added a provision 
with respect to strikes. We refer to Section 49-1-16, 
Subsection (c), which provides as follows: 
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an 
employee individually or in concert with others 
to cooperate in engaging in, promoting, or induc-
ing picketing (not constituting an exercise of con-
stitutionally guaranteed free speech), boycotting 
or any other overt concomitant of a strike unless 
a majority in a collective bargaining unit of the 
employees of an einployer against whom such acts 
are primarily directed have voted by secret ballot 
to call a strike." 
The Utah Labor Relations Act empowers the Utah 
Labor Board to determine what constitutes an appro-
priate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining; 
and as we have quoted for the convenience of the court, 
the Utah Act is practically identical with that of the 
N ationa1 Act. 
As we have stated, a multi-employer unit does 
constitute an appropriate unit, and has been so held 
to be appropriate in many cases. 
10 
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It will be noted fron1 the above section of the Utah 
Labor Relations Act that it is an unfair labor practice 
for an en1ployee, individually or in concert with others, 
to strike unless a majority in a collective bargaining 
unit has voted by secret ballot to call a strike. 
It can be readily understood by the enactment of 
the above section, that the legislature wanted to avert 
strikes in eYery possible way. Experience has taught 
that many times strikes are prompted by a representa-
tive of labor placing a picket line in front of a place of 
business even though the employees themselves have not 
by majority vote, voted for a strike. The legislature 
no doubt intended to assure employers and the public 
alike that a strike would not be called until and unless 
a majority of employees in the unit for the purpose 
of collective bargaining voted by majority vote in favor 
of such a strike. 
From the briefs filed in this case, it is apparent 
that the strike vote was not held in accordance with 
the Utah law; that is, in the appropriate unit, but held 
with two individual employers. The mere fact that they 
did not follow the Utah law does not have any bearing 
in the instant case. 
For the purpose of argument, let us assume that 
they had complied with the law and had the strike vote 
conducted as the law intended; that was in the unit 
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. 
If that were the case, then we have employees (the claim-
ants herein) participating in strike action, and in fur-
therance of the use of strike action, using economic force 
11 
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against two employers. We then have these employees 
who have put into operation strike action, and the econ-
omic weapons at their command to enforce such strike 
action, asking the benefits of unemployment compensa-
tion insurance. The Utah Employment Security Act 
did not intend that those employees participating in 
strike actions should be entitled to the benefits of the 
Act. 
Could it be said that the claimants involved herein 
were not parties or participants in a strike action~ 
We believe that they were in all respects. 
These claimants and other employees caused, by 
their own action, the strike, and no doubt did so with 
the full knowledge of what its consequences would mean. 
As we understand the facts, even after the strike 
was called, negotiations were continued with the em-
ployer group, thereby the representatives of these claim-
ants recognizing that the multi-employer unit still ex-
isted and was in full force and effect. 
We firmly believe that when strike action is put 
into effect as it was in this case in the appropriate unit, 
the employees in that unit, if they find themselves un-
employed by virtue of using that strike action, are not 
entitled to the benefits of the Utah Employment Secur-
ity Act. 
Without any question, these claimants were a part 
and parcel of an employee group who was unemployed 
due to a stoppage of work which existed because of a 
strike involving their group, and which they put into 
effect. It certainly would be contrary to the intent of 
12 
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the law to have employees put into effect strike action, 
and yet be eligible for the benefits of the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been our purpose in this brief to be of assist-
ance to the court to treat several phases of the question 
involved which we feel have not been treated by some 
of the briefs. We have not attempted by this brief to 
cover all the phases of the question involved, but only 
those which we feel have not yet been treated by the 
various briefs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUIS H. CALLISTER, 
Attorney for Industrial 
Relations Council, 
Amicus Curiae. 
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